Endogenous timing when a vertically integrated producer supplies a rival

被引:6
作者
Arya, Anil [1 ]
Mittendorf, Brian [1 ]
机构
[1] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
Competition; Input pricing; Time-to-market; Vertically integrated producer; COMMON AGENCY; COURNOT DUOPOLY; STACKELBERG; INDUSTRIES; CONFLICT; SABOTAGE;
D O I
10.1007/s11149-018-9368-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper derives the timing equilibrium when a vertically integrated producer (VIP) supplies essential inputs to its retail rival. Such circumstances arise in a variety of industries, often characterized by regulated input prices. The distinguishing feature of markets with an influential VIP is that the VIP is not only a retail competitor but is also concerned about wholesale profits-profits it gleans from its retail rival(s). The VIP's desire to balance profits across wholesale and retail markets leads to results that challenge conventional thinking about timing equilibria. Notably, under quantity competition, rather than the familiar cut-throat race to be a leader, the timing equilibrium prescribes a natural leader-follower sequencing, with each party in a win-win situation relative to simultaneous early play.
引用
收藏
页码:105 / 123
页数:19
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