Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games

被引：10

作者：

Carlsson, H

Ganslandt, M

机构：

[1] Univ Lund, Dept Econ, S-2207 Lund, Sweden

[2] Res Inst Ind Econ, Lund, Sweden

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1998年 / 60卷 / 01期

关键词：

equilibrium selection; coordination; strategic uncertainty; noise proofness; potential;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00076-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

By perturbing symmetric coordination games a la Bryant [Bryant, J., 1983. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 525-528] we derive unique solutions, the noise-proof equilibria. Our results agree with the experimental findings in Van Huyck et al. [Van Huyck, J.B., R.C. Battalio and R.O. Bell, 1990. American Economic Review 80, 234-248] and have an interesting connection with the notion of potential. We also briefly discuss median games. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.

引用

页码：23 / 34

页数：12

共 15 条

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