Relative performance or team evaluation? Optimal contracts for other-regarding agents

被引：56
作者：
Bartling, Bjoern [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Zurich, Dept Econ, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2011年 / 79卷 / 03期
关键词：
Other-regarding preferences; Inequity aversion; Status seeking; Relative performance evaluation; Low-powered incentives; MORAL HAZARD; INEQUALITY; INCENTIVES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.029
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper derives optimal incentive contracts for agents with other-regarding preferences. It offers a behavioral explanation for the empirically observed lack of relative performance evaluation. We analyze a principal-multi agent model and assume that agents are inequity averse or status seeking. We show that team contracts can be optimal even if the agents' performance measures are positively correlated such that relative performance evaluation would be optimal with purely self-interested agents and even though relative performance evaluation provides additional incentives to provide effort if agents have other-regarding preferences. Furthermore, optimal incentive contracts for other-regarding agents can be low-powered as compared to contracts for purely self-interested agents. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：183 / 193
页数：11
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