Strategic investment and learning with private information

被引：5

作者：

Wagner, Peter A. ^{[1
]}

Klein, Nicolas ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ York, Dept Econ, York, North Ireland

[2] Univ Montreal, Dept Econ, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[3] CIREQ, Montreal, PQ, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2022年 / 204卷

关键词：

Social learning; Investment timing; Strategic delay; Experimentation; Signaling; DIFFUSION; EXPERIMENTATION; EXTERNALITIES; INNOVATION; CASCADES; OTHERS; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2022.105523

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study social learning from actions and outcomes. Agents learn about future returns through privately observed signals, others' investment decisions and public experimentation outcomes when returns are realized. We characterize symmetric equilibria, and relate the extent of strategic delay of investments in equilibrium to the primitives of the information structure. Agents invest without delay in equilibrium when the most optimistic interim belief exceeds a threshold. Otherwise, delay in investments induces a learning feedback that may either raise or depress beliefs and investment choices. We show that, although ours is a strategic-experimentation game of pure informational externalities, private information may increase (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：31

共 55 条

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