Auctions with loss-averse bidders

被引：9

作者：

Eisenhuth, Roland ^{[1
]}

Grunewald, Mara ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Epsilon Econ, Chicago, IL 60606 USA

[2] Cologne Inst Econ Res, Konrad Adenauer Ufer 21, D-50668 Cologne, Germany

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2020年 / 16卷 / 02期

关键词：

auction; loss aversion; reference dependence; induced value auction; revenue equivalence; ALL-PAY AUCTIONS; SEALED-BID AUCTIONS; PROSPECT-THEORY; CONSUMERS;

D O I：

10.1111/ijet.12189

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

If bidders consider gains and losses in the context of whether they receive the object or not and how much they pay separately, the expected revenue is higher in the all-pay auction than in the first-price auction; if they consider gains and losses over the entire risk-neutral payoff, this revenue ranking is reversed. In laboratory experiments, we auction money and a real object: the average revenue is significantly higher in the first-price auction than in the all-pay auction, suggesting that bidders behave according to wide and not narrow bracketing of gains and losses in both auction settings.

引用

页码：129 / 152

页数：24

共 29 条

[1]

Beauchamp JonathanP., 2012, How Malleable Are Risk Preferences and Loss Aversion?

[2] Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints [J].