Negative States of Affairs in Ingarden's Ontology

The paper offers an ontological analysis of negative states of affairs in Ingarden's ontology. The debate about negative states of affairs has revolved around establishing their existential status, in particular whether they are heteronomous or autonomous. On the one hand, Ingarden is often perceived as a reductionist who claims that negative states of affairs enjoy a very weak mode of being: they are purely intentional entities. On the other hand, according to Ingarden, they are ontologically dependent on positive states of affairs, which are autonomous. While Ingarden's position is vague, it is hard to accept the idea that negative states of affairs should have both heteronomous and autonomous aspects. Those problems arise when Ingarden moves from ontological to epistemological domain. I maintain that the understanding of negative states of affairs as purely intentional is simply a result of following the epistemological way of thinking and is in conflict with some of his ontological statements.