Nash implementation theory - A note on full characterizations

被引：3

作者：

Korpela, Ville ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Turku, PCRC, FIN-20014 Turku, Finland

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 108卷 / 03期

关键词：

(Maskin) Monotonicity; Moore-Repullo-set; Nash implementation; No veto power; n >= 2 players;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.019

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The first full characterization of social choice correspondences that are implementable in Nash equilibrium, given in Moore and Repullo (1990), together with the working principle behind an algorithm to check this condition, given in Sjostrom (1991), can be used to give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for implementation that is a generalization of monotonicity. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：283 / 285

页数：3

共 7 条

[1] Maskin's theorem with limited veto power [J].