How managers? risk perceptions affect their willingness to blame advisors as scapegoats

Managers spend considerable amounts of corporate money to hire consultants. The research proposes two po-tential benefits of consultants' advice: increasing decision accuracy and sharing responsibility with the advisor. In contrast to previous research, which has predominantly focused on factors influencing decisional accuracy, this paper evaluates the sharing of responsibility in the form of using an advisor as a scapegoat. We conduct an online experiment with 175 managers from German-speaking countries in an investment setting. We find that the presence of a potential scapegoat positively affects advice utilization in an economic boom but negatively affects such utilization in an economic crisis due to managers' varying risk perceptions. Managers' risk perceptions are the main drivers of scapegoating as a form of managerial blame avoiding decision-making. We contribute to management research and highlight managers' opportunistic motives behind consulting (costly) advice.