Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes

被引：8

作者：

Marjit, Sugata ^{[1
]}

Seidel, Andre ^{[2
]}

Thum, Marcel ^{[2
,3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Calcutta Univ, Kolkata, W Bengal, India

[2] Tech Univ Dresden, Dresden, Germany

[3] Ifo Dresden, Dresden, Germany

[4] CESifo, Dresden, Germany

来源：

GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2017年 / 18卷 / 03期

关键词：

Tax evasion; tax avoidance; corruption; enforcement; ECONOMICS; EXTORTION; TAXATION;

D O I：

10.1111/geer.12107

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental to a revenue-maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.

引用

页码：283 / 301

页数：19

共 23 条

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