Military spending, liberal institutions and state compliance with international environmental agreements

被引:6
|
作者
Carbonell, Joel R. [1 ]
机构
[1] Kent State Univ Stark Campus, Dept Polit Sci, North Canton, OH 44720 USA
关键词
Military spending; Democracy; Environmental protection; International environmental agreements; Environmental policy; ARMED CONFLICT; CLIMATE-CHANGE; SECURITY; GUNS; RESOURCES; DEMOCRACY; ECONOMY; BUTTER; WATER;
D O I
10.1007/s10784-015-9290-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The current paper examines the dynamics of state security behavior and international environmental protection. In particular, the study provides a liberal institutional approach in identifying a "guns and butter" relationship between military spending and state participation with international environmental agreements. This cross-national study employs both bivariate and multivariate regression models to analyze the relationship between military expenditures and state participation with international environmental agreements, particularly examining the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. The empirics of the study suggest that states with higher military expenditures as a percent of GDP are less likely to comply with international environmental agreements. Theoretical and empirical implications are presented in the conclusion section.
引用
收藏
页码:691 / 719
页数:29
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