Game on International Transfer of Low-carbon Technologies under Incomplete Information

Game theory is applied to investigate the impact of incomplete information on international transfer of low-carbon technologies. This paper established a dynamic game model under two-sided multidimensional incomplete information, analyzed co-operation space of technology transfer, corresponding equilibrium and their policy implications. It is shown that incomplete information brings important impact on cooperation space of international low-carbon technology transfer; information advantages of participants are not necessarily beneficial in international low-carbon technology transfer; incomplete information clearly leads to non-efficiency with the technology transfer agreement being delayed; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) should strengthen research and communication, establish appropriate information exchange mechanisms on technology transfer, in order to eliminate or reduce information incompleteness, reduce adverse selection and increase efficiency, improve the welfare of all parties; while greenhouse gas emissions reduction and ancillary benefits from international transfer of low-carbon technologies extend cooperation space of technology transfer, developing countries need to strengthen independent R&D for technologies which involve core competitiveness.