The biconditional doctrine:: Contra Kolbel on a "dogma" of Davidsonian semantics

Should a theory of meaning state what sentences mean, and can a Davidsonian theory of meaning in particular do so? Max Kolbel answers both questions affirmatively. I argue, however, that the phenomena of non-homophony, non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning, semantic mood, and context-sensitivity provide prima facie obstacles for extending Davidsonian truth-theories to yield meaning-stating theorems. Assessing some natural moves in reply requires a more fully developed conception of the task of such theories than Kolbel provides. A more developed conception is also required to defend his positive answer to the first question above. I argue that, however Kolbel might elaborate his position, it can't be by embracing the sort of cognitivist account of Davidsonian semantics to which he sometimes alludes.