The effect of SOX on small auditor exits and audit quality

被引：212

作者：

DeFond, Mark L. ^{[1
]}

Lennox, Clive S. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ So Calif, Leventhal Sch Accounting, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA

[2] Nanyang Technol Univ, Singapore, Singapore

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 52卷 / 01期

关键词：

Audit quality; Sarbanes-Oxley act; PCAOB; Audit markets; Auditor opinions; SARBANES-OXLEY-ACT; INDEPENDENCE; CONSEQUENCES; OPINIONS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.03.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We find that over six hundred auditors with fewer than 100 SEC clients exit the market following SOX. Compared to the non-exiting auditors, the exiting auditors are lower quality, where quality is gauged by: (1) avoidance of AICPA peer reviews and failure to comply with PCAOB rules, and (2) severity of the peer review and inspection reports. in addition, clients of exiting auditors receive higher quality auditing from successor auditors, as captured by a greater likelihood of receiving going concern opinions. Our results suggest that the PCAOB inspections improve audit quality by incentivizing low quality auditors to exit the market. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：21 / 40

页数：20

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