Premium auctions and risk preferences

被引：10
作者：
Hu, Audrey [2 ]
Offerman, Theo [1 ]
Zou, Liang [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Amsterdam, CREED, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] Univ Heidelberg, Alfred Weber Inst, DE-69115 Heidelberg, Germany
[3] Univ Amsterdam, ABS, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2011年 / 146卷 / 06期
关键词：
Premium auction; English auction; Risk preference; Net-premium effect; AVERSE BUYERS; BID AUCTIONS; DESIGN; EQUILIBRIUM; BIDDERS; INFORMATION; UNIQUENESS; EXISTENCE; ENTRY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In a premium auction, the seller offers some "payback", called premium, to a set of high bidders at the end of the auction. This paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the bidders' risk preferences. We analyze a two-stage English premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values, in which the bidders may be risk averse or risk preferring. Upon establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium, we show that the premium causes the expected revenue to increase in the bidders' risk tolerance. A "net-premium effect" is key to this result. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：2420 / 2439
页数：20
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