Aristotle and the Origins of Evil

被引:2
作者
Mueller, Jozef [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Riverside, Dept Philosophy, Riverside, CA 92521 USA
来源
PHRONESIS-A JOURNAL FOR ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY | 2019年 / 65卷 / 02期
关键词
evil; rationality; desire; teleology; human nature; CHARACTER;
D O I
10.1163/15685284-12342099
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Why do human beings, on Aristotle's view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond and against their natural needs? Given Aristotle's teleological assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality, in particular in the (necessary) presence of theoretical reason. As theoretical reason requires that human beings have unlimited non-rational desires for the fine (to kalon), it also gives rise to a tendency to form unlimited non-rational desires for other things.
引用
收藏
页码:179 / 223
页数:45
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