Effects of disclosed audit sanctions on audit firm's market share in Italy and Spain

被引：4

作者：

Azzali, Stefano ^{[1
]}

Mazza, Tatiana ^{[1
]}

Alberto, Fernanda ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Parma, Parma, Italy

[2] ISCAC Coimbra Business Sch, Quinta Agr Bencanta, Coimbra, Portugal

来源：

ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE | 2021年 / 61卷

关键词：

Audit sanctions; Audit market share; Public oversight; INSPECTION REPORTS; OVERSIGHT; QUALITY; IMPACT; CONSEQUENCES; DEFICIENCIES; CREDIBILITY; REPUTATION; SEVERITY; CLIENTS;

D O I：

10.1111/acfi.12672

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We use neo-institutional theory to investigate the effect of disclosed audit sanctions on change in audit firm market share. Using hand-collected data from public oversight board sanctions on audit firms in Italy and Spain, we show that disclosed audit sanctions have a negative effect on change in audit firm market share. Moreover, we find that for Big4, severe disclosed audit sanctions have a greater negative effect. We contribute to the literature on public oversight authorities, showing that through disclosing audit sanctions, they help investors to select higher quality auditors, who are able to avoid sanctions and charge a market share premium.

引用

页码：2477 / 2505

页数：29

共 46 条

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[2]

[Anonymous], 1998, European Accounting Review

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