PLANT-LEVEL EVALUATION OF CHINA'S NATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: BENCHMARK MATTERS

被引:16
|
作者
Ma, Rong [1 ]
Qian, Haoqi [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Fudan Univ, Sch Econ, Guoquan Rd 600, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[2] Fudan Univ, Inst Global Publ Policy, Handan Rd 220, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[3] Fudan Univ, LSE Fudan Res Ctr Global Publ Policy, Handan Rd 220, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[4] Fudan Univ, Shanghai Inst Energy & Carbon Neutral Strategy, Handan Rd 220, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Emissions trading scheme; permit allocation; benchmarking approach; policy design; QUASI-NATURAL EXPERIMENT; CARBON; MARKET; POLICY; ENERGY; IMPACTS; SYSTEMS; SECTOR; CAP;
D O I
10.1142/S2010007822400097
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
China's national emission trading scheme (ETS) started operating in 2021 after four years of preparation. In the initial stage of national ETS, benchmarking approach is one of the hottest topics that have gained sufficient attention. For the reason that benchmarks will greatly affect the permits allocation results and thus affect the effectiveness of the carbon market. This paper attempts to investigate the impacts of the benchmark designs of China's ETS by using plant-level data. Main results show that the current lax benchmark standards adopted by the national ETS will lead to excess surplus of permits. The whole carbon market will achieve market clearance only when the benchmark standards are set as high as the top 2% efficiency levels. If the carbon price is 200 yuan/ton, the annual trading volume will be 16.4 billion yuan and 13.2 billion yuan in extra will be spent on carbon offsetting for compliance. If the auction mechanism is introduced, the total market size will significantly increase. The auction revenue will exceed 300 billion yuan when 50% of permits are allocated through auction and will exceed 600 billion yuan when all permits are auctioned. These revenues can provide sufficient funds to accelerate China's low-carbon transformation as well as improve social welfare.
引用
收藏
页数:25
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