Market liquidity, investor participation, and managerial autonomy: Why do firms go private?

被引：39

作者：

Boot, Arnoud W. A. ^{[1
]}

Gopalan, Radhakrishnan ^{[2
]}

Thakor, Anjan V. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Amsterdam, NL-1012 WX Amsterdam, Netherlands

[2] Washington Univ, John M Olin Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63130 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2008年 / 63卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01380.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We focus on public-market investor participation to analyze the firm's decision to stay public or go private. The liquidity of public ownership is both a blessing and a curse: It lowers the cost of capital, but also introduces volatility in a firm's shareholder base, exposing management to uncertainty regarding shareholder intervention in management decisions, thereby affecting the manager's perceived decision-making autonomy and curtailing managerial inputs. We extract predictions about how investor participation affects stock price level and volatility and the public firm's incentives to go private, providing a link between investor participation and firm participation in public markets.

引用

页码：2013 / 2059

页数：47

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