Amygdala lesions do not compromise the cortical network for false-belief reasoning

被引:21
|
作者
Spunt, Robert P. [1 ]
Elison, Jed T. [1 ,2 ]
Dufour, Nicholas [3 ]
Hurlemann, Rene [4 ]
Saxe, Rebecca [3 ]
Adolphs, Ralph [1 ]
机构
[1] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
[2] Univ Minnesota, Inst Child Dev, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
[3] MIT, Dept Brain & Cognit Sci, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[4] Univ Bonn, Dept Psychiat, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
关键词
theory-of-mind; amygdala; lesions; false-belief; fMRI; MONKEYS MACACA-MULATTA; SOCIAL COGNITION; TEMPOROPARIETAL JUNCTION; INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES; FUNCTIONAL AMYGDALA; PREFRONTAL CORTEX; FRONTAL-CORTEX; MIND; DAMAGE; AUTISM;
D O I
10.1073/pnas.1422679112
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
The amygdala plays an integral role in human social cognition and behavior, with clear links to emotion recognition, trust judgments, anthropomorphization, and psychiatric disorders ranging from social phobia to autism. A central feature of human social cognition is a theory-of-mind (ToM) that enables the representation other people's mental states as distinct from one's own. Numerous neuroimaging studies of the best studied use of ToM-false-belief reasoning-suggest that it relies on a specific cortical network; moreover, the amygdala is structurally and functionally connected with many components of this cortical network. It remains unknown whether the cortical implementation of any form of ToM depends on amygdala function. Here we investigated this question directly by conducting functional MRI on two patients with rare bilateral amygdala lesions while they performed a neuroimaging protocol standardized for measuring cortical activity associated with false-belief reasoning. We compared patient responses with those of two healthy comparison groups that included 480 adults. Based on both univariate and multivariate comparisons, neither patient showed any evidence of atypical cortical activity or any evidence of atypical behavioral performance; moreover, this pattern of typical cortical and behavioral response was replicated for both patients in a follow-up session. These findings argue that the amygdala is not necessary for the cortical implementation of ToM in adulthood and suggest a reevaluation of the role of the amygdala and its cortical interactions in human social cognition.
引用
收藏
页码:4827 / 4832
页数:6
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