Biased but in Doubt: Conflict and Decision Confidence

被引:119
作者
De Neys, Wim [1 ]
Cromheeke, Sofie [2 ]
Osman, Magda [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toulouse, CNRS, Toulouse, France
[2] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Dept Psychol, Leuven, Belgium
[3] Queen Mary Univ London, Sch Biol & Chem Sci, London, England
来源
PLOS ONE | 2011年 / 6卷 / 01期
基金
英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;
关键词
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES; CONJUNCTION FALLACY; 2; SYSTEMS; JUDGMENT; THINKING; RATIONALITY; ADOLESCENT; RESOLUTION; ACCOUNTS; MEMORY;
D O I
10.1371/journal.pone.0015954
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Human reasoning is often biased by intuitive heuristics. A central question is whether the bias results from a failure to detect that the intuitions conflict with traditional normative considerations or from a failure to discard the tempting intuitions. The present study addressed this unresolved debate by using people's decision confidence as a nonverbal index of conflict detection. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were after solving classic base-rate (Experiment 1) and conjunction fallacy (Experiment 2) problems in which a cued intuitive response could be inconsistent or consistent with the traditional correct response. Results indicated that reasoners showed a clear confidence decrease when they gave an intuitive response that conflicted with the normative response. Contrary to popular belief, this establishes that people seem to acknowledge that their intuitive answers are not fully warranted. Experiment 3 established that younger reasoners did not yet show the confidence decrease, which points to the role of improved bias awareness in our reasoning development. Implications for the long standing debate on human rationality are discussed.
引用
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页数:10
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