Coalitional stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems

被引：1

作者：

Nizamogullari, Duygu ^{[1
]}

Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Istanbul Bilgi Univ, Dept Math, Istanbul, Turkey

[2] Istanbul Bilgi Univ, Dept Econ, Istanbul, Turkey

[3] Istanbul Bilgi Univ, Murat Sertel Ctr Adv Econ Studies, Istanbul, Turkey

来源：

THEORY AND DECISION | 2011年 / 71卷 / 03期

关键词：

Matching; Membership property rights; Partition; Coalitional stability; Efficiency;

D O I：

10.1007/s11238-010-9204-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A-zkal-Sanver (Theory Decis 59:193-205, 2005) studies stability and efficiency of partitions of agents in two-sided matching markets in which agents can form partitions by individual moves only, and a matching rule determines the matching in each coalition in a partition. In this study, we present the relationship between stability and efficiency of partitions that is analyzed for several matching rules and under various membership property rights codes, now allowing coalitional moves.

引用

页码：395 / 407

页数：13

共 13 条

[1] Asan G, 2003, STU ECO DES, P251
[2] BOGOMOLNAIA A, 2002, GAME ECON BEHAV, V38, P210
[3] Migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium: existence and asymptotic efficiency
Conley, JP
Konishi, H
[J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2002, 86 (02) : 243 - 262
[4] HEDONIC COALITIONS - OPTIMALITY AND STABILITY
DREZE, JH
GREENBERG, J
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1980, 48 (04) : 987 - 1003
[5] EREN NI, 1993, THESIS BOGAZICI U IS
[6] COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE
GALE, D
SHAPLEY, LS
[J]. AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) : 9 - &
[7] STRONG TIEBOUT EQUILIBRIUM UNDER RESTRICTED PREFERENCES DOMAIN
GREENBERG, J
WEBER, S
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 38 (01) : 101 - 117
[8] GREENBERG J, 1977, PUBLIC FINANCE
[9] KORAY S, 2008, THESIS BILKENT U ANK
[10] Stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems
Özkal-Sanver, I
[J]. THEORY AND DECISION, 2005, 59 (03) : 193 - 205

← 1 2 →