Decreasing farm number benefits the mitigation of agricultural non-point source pollution in China

被引:59
作者
Fan, Liangcong [1 ,2 ]
Yuan, Yuemei [3 ]
Ying, Zechun [3 ]
Lam, Shu Kee [4 ]
Liu, Lu [3 ]
Zhang, Xinchao [3 ]
Liu, Hongbin [5 ]
Gu, Baojing [6 ]
机构
[1] Zhejiang Univ, Guanghua Law Sch, Hangzhou 310008, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[2] Collaborat Innovat Ctr Judicial Civilizat, Hangzhou 310008, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[3] Zhejiang Univ, Sch Econ, Hangzhou 310027, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[4] Univ Melbourne, Sch Agr & Food, Melbourne, Vic 3010, Australia
[5] Chinese Acad Agr Sci, Minist Agr, Inst Agr Resources & Reg Planning, Key Lab Nonpoint Source Pollut Control, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[6] Zhejiang Univ, Dept Land Management, 866 Yuhangtang Rd, Hangzhou 310058, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
基金
澳大利亚研究理事会; 英国生物技术与生命科学研究理事会; 中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Common-pool resource; Human behavior; Communication effect; Group size effect; Last round effect; Pollution governance; CLOSING YIELD GAPS; NITROGEN; COOPERATION;
D O I
10.1007/s11356-018-3622-6
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Agricultural non-point source pollution causes global warming and the deterioration of air and water quality. It is difficult to identify and monitor the emission sources of agricultural pollution due to the large number of farms in China. Many studies focus on the technological aspect of achieving agricultural sustainability, but its socioeconomic aspect is poorly understood. Here, we report how group size (number of farms in a certain region) affects agricultural pollution governance through conducting a social science experiment. We found that when communication was allowed among group members, a small group size facilitated cooperation. Although deviations from the cooperation equilibrium occurred with time in all groups, the smaller the group size, the slower the cooperation equilibrium became frangible. These findings suggest that reducing number of farms and extending the length of farm property rights can benefit the mitigation of agricultural non-point pollution in China. Social science experiments can be a useful tool to understand the socioeconomic aspect of agricultural sustainability.
引用
收藏
页码:464 / 472
页数:9
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