Political economy of Ramsey taxation

被引：30

作者：

Acemoglu, Daron ^{[2
]}

Golosov, Mikhail ^{[1
]}

Tsyvinski, Aleh ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[2] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 95卷 / 7-8期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Capital taxation; Fiscal policy; Political economy; OPTIMAL FISCAL-POLICY; REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY; TAXES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.014

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies. We show that, as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens, the Chamley-Judd result of zero long-run taxes holds. In contrast, if the politician is less patient than the citizens, the best (subgame perfect) equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long-run capital taxation. (C) 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页码：467 / 475

页数：9

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