Hegel's metaphilosophy of idealism

被引:0
|
作者
Chambers, James [1 ]
机构
[1] Hebei Univ, Sch Philosophy & Sociol, 2666 Seventy 6 East St, Baoding 071100, Hebei, Peoples R China
关键词
absolute idealism; conceptual realism; dialectics; Hegel; idealism; metaphilosophy; Robert Stern;
D O I
10.1111/meta.12509
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
If, as Hegel claims, all philosophy is idealism, then defining his philosophy in these terms makes his idealism a metaphilosophy. This most obvious fact about his definition is the most overlooked. It is the key to a definitive, comprehensive and clear-cut interpretation of Hegel's idealism. If Hegel defines all philosophy as idealism and thus his own idealism as a metaphilosophy, then his own idealism must be both the same as the old philosophies in this respect and also different in the sense that it embodies self-conscious awareness. Hegel divides philosophy into pre-reflective, pre-speculative, unconscious idealism and his own reflective, speculative, thus self-conscious, absolute idealism. Missing this obvious fact is the Achilles' heel of Stern's non-mentalistic interpretation in the only other in-depth study of this topic, the object of this article's critique. If Hegel's idealism is a metaphilosophy, then it is a radical mentalistic ontology of mind and its thoughts.
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页码:628 / 641
页数:14
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