Is a cap-and-trade system always efficient?: The case of new entrants in the emissions trading system of the EU

被引:7
作者
Bartels, Michael [1 ]
Muesgens, Felix [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cologne, Inst Energy Econ, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
[2] Univ Cologne, Dept Econ, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
来源
JOURNAL OF ENERGY ENGINEERING-ASCE | 2008年 / 134卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9402(2008)134:2(33)
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes the effects of allocating CO2 permits to new power plants free of charge within a tradable permit system. We demonstrate that these free allocations distort investments. Furthermore, we distinguish the effects of a uniform benchmark from a fuel specific benchmark, as both are common elements in EU member states' national allocation plans. An empirical model for the European market is used to quantify the effects in a realistic framework.
引用
收藏
页码:33 / 39
页数:7
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