Does target firm insider trading signal the target's synergy potential in mergers and acquisitions?
被引:34
作者:
Suk, Inho
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机构:
State Univ New York SUNY Buffalo, Jacobs Management Ctr 342, Sch Management, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA
Korea Univ, Business Sch KUBS, Seoul 02841, South KoreaState Univ New York SUNY Buffalo, Jacobs Management Ctr 342, Sch Management, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA
Suk, Inho
[1
,2
]
Wang, Mengmeng
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ North Carolina UNC Greensboro, Bryan Sch Business & Econ, Greensboro, NC 27412 USAState Univ New York SUNY Buffalo, Jacobs Management Ctr 342, Sch Management, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA
Wang, Mengmeng
[3
]
机构:
[1] State Univ New York SUNY Buffalo, Jacobs Management Ctr 342, Sch Management, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA
[2] Korea Univ, Business Sch KUBS, Seoul 02841, South Korea
[3] Univ North Carolina UNC Greensboro, Bryan Sch Business & Econ, Greensboro, NC 27412 USA
We find that the acquirer's (1) abnormal returns at merger and acquisition (M&A) an-nouncements and (2) long-term abnormal returns after acquisitions increase with tar -get firm insiders' net purchase ratios. Further, acquisition synergies, measured as the (1) acquirer-target combined cumulative abnormal returns at M&A announcements and (2) changes in three-year operating performance after acquisitions, increase with target in-sider net purchase ratios. Notwithstanding, targets with higher insider net purchase ratios receive higher takeover premiums. Overall, our findings suggest that, even under the SEC's "short-swing rule," target insider trading prior to the M&A announcement serves as a cred-ible signal for acquisition outcomes. (c) 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V.