Does target firm insider trading signal the target's synergy potential in mergers and acquisitions?

被引:34
作者
Suk, Inho [1 ,2 ]
Wang, Mengmeng [3 ]
机构
[1] State Univ New York SUNY Buffalo, Jacobs Management Ctr 342, Sch Management, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA
[2] Korea Univ, Business Sch KUBS, Seoul 02841, South Korea
[3] Univ North Carolina UNC Greensboro, Bryan Sch Business & Econ, Greensboro, NC 27412 USA
关键词
Insider trades; Mergers and acquisitions; Regulation; Information asymmetry; Signaling; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; REGULATION FD; STOCK; QUALITY; INFORMATION; EARNINGS; ANNOUNCEMENTS; PERFORMANCE; DISCLOSURE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.038
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find that the acquirer's (1) abnormal returns at merger and acquisition (M&A) an-nouncements and (2) long-term abnormal returns after acquisitions increase with tar -get firm insiders' net purchase ratios. Further, acquisition synergies, measured as the (1) acquirer-target combined cumulative abnormal returns at M&A announcements and (2) changes in three-year operating performance after acquisitions, increase with target in-sider net purchase ratios. Notwithstanding, targets with higher insider net purchase ratios receive higher takeover premiums. Overall, our findings suggest that, even under the SEC's "short-swing rule," target insider trading prior to the M&A announcement serves as a cred-ible signal for acquisition outcomes. (c) 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:1155 / 1185
页数:31
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