Understanding decentralization of decision-making power in proof-of-stake blockchains: an agent-based simulation approach

被引:11
作者
Mueller-Bloch, Christoph [1 ]
Andersen, Jonas Valbjorn [2 ]
Spasovski, Jason [3 ]
Hahn, Jungpil [4 ]
机构
[1] ESSEC Business Sch, Dept Informat Syst Decis Sci & Stat IDS, Cergy Pontoise, France
[2] IT Univ Copenhagen, Dept Business IT, Copenhagen, Denmark
[3] ZTLment, Copenhagen, Denmark
[4] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Informat Syst & Analyt, Singapore, Singapore
关键词
Blockchain; consensus mechanism; centralisation; decentralisation; decision-making power; governance; INFORMATION-TECHNOLOGY; GOVERNANCE; SYSTEMS; ARCHITECTURE; PERSPECTIVE; FRAMEWORK; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.1080/0960085X.2022.2125840
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Blockchain systems allow for securely keeping shared records of transactions in a decentralised way. This is enabled by algorithms called consensus mechanisms. Proof-of-work is the most prominent consensus mechanism, but environmentally unsustainable. Here, we focus on proof-of-stake, its best-known alternative. Importantly, decentralised decision-making power is not an inherent feature of blockchain systems, but a technological possibility. Numerous security incidents illustrate that decentralised control cannot be taken for granted. We therefore study how key parameters affect the degree of decentralisation in proof-of-stake blockchain systems. Based on a real-world implementation of a proof-of-stake blockchain system, we conduct agent-based simulations to study how a range of parameters impact decentralisation. The results suggest that high numbers of initial potential validator nodes, large transactions, a high number of transactions, and a very high or very low positive validator network growth rate increase decentralisation. We find weak support for an impact of changes in transaction fees and initial stake distributions. Our study highlights how blockchain challenges our understanding of decentralisation in information systems research, and contributes to understanding the governance mechanisms that lead to decentralisation in proof-of-stake blockchain systems as well as to designing proof-of-stake blockchain systems that are prone to decentralisation and therefore more secure.
引用
收藏
页码:267 / 286
页数:20
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