Herding and anti-herding: A model of reputational differentiation

被引：38

作者：

Effinger, MR

Polborn, MK

机构：

[1] Univ Munich, Seminar Versicherungswissensch, D-80539 Munich, Germany

[2] Univ Munich, Munich, Germany

[3] Univ Sci Sociales Toulouse, Toulouse, France

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2001年 / 45卷 / 03期

关键词：

herding; strategic communication; career concerns;

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00070-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We analyze a model related to the strategic herding literature where a second expert maximizes his expected second period value by conforming with a first expert ('herding'). In contrast to the herding literature we assume that an agent is most valuable if he is the only smart agent. If the value of being the only smart agent is sufficiently large, the second expert always opposes its predecessor's report; otherwise, herding may result. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D8; L0.

引用

页码：385 / 403

页数：19

共 16 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1996, J EC SURVS

[2] A SIMPLE-MODEL OF HERD BEHAVIOR [J].