Desire, depression, and rationality

被引:2
作者
Goldman, Alan [1 ]
机构
[1] Coll William & Mary, Dept Philosophy, Williamsburg, VA 23185 USA
关键词
desire; emotion; rationality;
D O I
10.1080/09515080701665912
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
Internalists hold that all reasons derive from existing motivations. They also hold that agents act irrationally when they fail to act on the strongest reasons they have. Emotions can make one act irrationally. But depression as an emotion tends to remove the motivation to act at the same time as it causes irrational inaction. If depression can cause irrationality, then the reasons to act must remain. Hence the internalist must explain how reasons can remain if depression removes motivation. This paper does so by arguing that the cognitive, evaluative aspect of motivation remains when the dispositional and affective aspects are removed.
引用
收藏
页码:711 / 730
页数:20
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