Mental models and deduction

被引:232
作者
Johnson-Laird, PN [1 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Psychol, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01751-4
中图分类号
B84 [心理学]; C [社会科学总论]; Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ; 030303 ; 04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
According to the mental-model theory of deductive reasoning, reasoners use the meanings of assertions together with general knowledge to construct mental models of the possibilities compatible with the premises. Each model represents what is true in a possibility. A conclusion is held to be valid if it holds in all the models of the premises. Recent evidence described here shows that the fewer models an inference calls for, the easier the inference is. Errors arise because reasoners fail to consider all possible models, and because models do not normally represent what is false, even though reasoners can construct counterexamples to refute invalid conclusions.
引用
收藏
页码:434 / 442
页数:9
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