Declining prices in sequential auctions with complete revelation of bids

被引：13

作者：

Kannan, Karthik N. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 108卷 / 01期

关键词：

Auctions; Sequential auctions; Declining price anomaly;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.021

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a sequential-auction setting, the expected-winning prices are shown to decline across two stages when all bids are revealed between the stages. The prices decline because bidders desire to hide their private valuation information. The hiding also leads to inefficient allocations. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：49 / 51

页数：3

共 15 条

[1]

[Anonymous], AUCTIONS BIDDING CON

[2] HOW AUCTIONS WORK FOR WINE AND ART [J].

ASHENFELTER, O .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1989, 3 (03) :23-36

[3]

BERNHARDT D, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P653

[4] Sequential auctions with synergies: An example [J].

Branco, F .

ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1997, 54 (02) :159-163

[5]

ENGLEBRECHTWIGG.R, 1994, ECON LETT, P87

[6]

JEITSCHKO T, 1998, SO EC J, V1, P98

[7]

Jeitschko T. D., 1999, ECON LETT, P67

[8] Declining valuations in sequential auctions [J].

Kittsteiner, T ;

Nikutta, J ;

Winter, E .

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2004, 33 (01) :89-106

[9] Sequential auctions: theory and evidence from the Seattle Fur Exchange [J].

Lambson, Val E. ;

Thurston, Norman K. .

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2006, 37 (01) :70-80

[10]

MASKIN ES, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P150

← 1 2 →