Meaningful and meaningless solutions for cooperative n-person games

被引:14
作者
Pekec, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
robustness and sensitivity analysis; game theory;
D O I
10.1016/S0377-2217(00)00208-3
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Game values often represent data that can be measured in more than one acceptable way (e.g., monetary amounts). We point out that in such a case a statement about cooperative n-person game models might be "meaningless" in the sense that its truth or falsity depends on the choice of an acceptable way to measure Same values. In particular, we analyze statements about solution concepts such as the core, stable sets, the nucleolus, the Shapley value land some of its generalizations). (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:608 / 623
页数:16
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