Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile

被引：1024

作者：

Koscher, Karl ^{[1
]}

Czeskis, Alexei ^{[1
]}

Roesner, Franziska ^{[1
]}

Patel, Shwetak ^{[1
]}

Kohno, Tadayoshi ^{[1
]}

Checkoway, Stephen ^{[2
]}

Mccoy, Damon ^{[2
]}

Kantor, Brian ^{[2
]}

Anderson, Danny ^{[2
]}

Shacham, Hovav ^{[2
]}

Savage, Stefan ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Washington, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Seattle, WA 98195 USA

[2] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

来源：

2010 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY | 2010年

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Automobiles; communication standards; communication system security; computer security; data buses;

D O I：

10.1109/SP.2010.34

中图分类号：

TP301 [理论、方法];

学科分类号：

081202 ;

摘要：

Modern automobiles are no longer mere mechanical devices; they are pervasively monitored and controlled by dozens of digital computers coordinated via internal vehicular networks. While this transformation has driven major advancements in efficiency and safety, it has also introduced a range of new potential risks. In this paper we experimentally evaluate these issues on a modern automobile and demonstrate the fragility of the underlying system structure. We demonstrate that an attacker who is able to infiltrate virtually any Electronic Control Unit (ECU) can leverage this ability to completely circumvent a broad array of safety-critical systems. Over a range of experiments, both in the lab and in road tests, we demonstrate the ability to adversarially control a wide range of automotive functions and completely ignore driver input-including disabling the brakes, selectively braking individual wheels on demand, stopping the engine, and so on. We find that it is possible to bypass rudimentary network security protections within the car, such as maliciously bridging between our car's two internal subnets. We also present composite attacks that leverage individual weaknesses, including an attack that embeds malicious code in a car's telematics unit and that will completely erase any evidence of its presence after a crash. Looking forward, we discuss the complex challenges in addressing these vulnerabilities while considering the existing automotive ecosystem.

引用

页码：447 / 462

页数：16

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