Financial Incentives And Measurement Improved Physicians' Quality Of Care In The Philippines

被引:48
作者
Peabody, John [1 ,6 ,8 ]
Shimkhada, Riti [2 ]
Quimbo, Stella [3 ]
Florentino, Jhiedon [4 ]
Bacate, Marife [5 ]
McCulloch, Charles E. [7 ]
Solon, Orville [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Francisco, Epidemiol & Biostat Div, San Francisco, CA 94143 USA
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Hlth Serv, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA
[3] Univ Philippines, Sch Econ, Quezon City 1101, Philippines
[4] US Agcy Int Dev, Hlth Policy Dev Program, Manila, Philippines
[5] Asian Dev Bank, Manila, Philippines
[6] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Sch Publ Hlth, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA
[7] Univ Calif San Francisco, Div Biostat, San Francisco, CA 94143 USA
[8] Univ Calif San Francisco, Div Med, San Francisco, CA 94143 USA
基金
美国国家卫生研究院;
关键词
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE; STANDARDIZED PATIENTS; CLINICAL VIGNETTES; PUBLIC RELEASE; HEALTH-CARE; EXPERIENCE; IMPACT; QIDS;
D O I
10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0782
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
The merits of using financial incentives to improve clinical quality have much appeal, yet few studies have rigorously assessed the potential benefits. The uncertainty surrounding assessments of quality can lead to poor policy decisions, possibly resulting in increased cost with little or no quality improvement, or missed opportunities to improve care. We conducted an experiment involving physicians in thirty Philippine hospitals that overcomes many of the limitations of previous studies. We measured clinical performance and then examined whether modest bonuses equal to about 5 percent of a physician's salary, as well as system-level incentives that increased compensation to hospitals and across groups of physicians, led to improvements in the quality of care. We found that both the bonus and system-level incentives improved scores in a quality measurement system used in our study by ten percentage points. Our findings suggest that when careful measurement is combined with the types of incentives we studied, there may be a larger impact on quality than previously recognized.
引用
收藏
页码:773 / 781
页数:9
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