Top Management Team Power in China: Measurement and Validation

被引:34
作者
Ke, Bin [1 ]
Mao, Xinshu [2 ]
Wang, Bin [3 ]
Zuo, Luo [4 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Business Sch, Dept Accounting, Singapore 119245, Singapore
[2] Beijing Technol & Business Univ, Business Sch, Dept Accounting, Beijing 100048, Peoples R China
[3] Beijing Technol & Business Univ, Business Sch, Dept Finance, Beijing 100048, Peoples R China
[4] Cornell Univ, Samuel Curtis Johnson Grad Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
power; top management team; executive compensation; nonmarket institutional force; China; EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION; FIRM VALUE; CORPORATE; STYLE; ORGANIZATION; PERFORMANCE; DIRECTORS;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2020.3798
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We propose and validate a comprehensive measure of power for the top management teams (TMTs) of publicly listed Chinese firms. We show that our measure is positively associated with the four power dimensions developed by prior research for U.S. firms as well as three Asia-relevant power dimensions, including political capital, seniority, and gender. We find that our TMT power measure is a valid proxy for TMT power for both state-controlled firms and non-state-controlled firms. We also compare our TMT power measure with one alternative TMT power proxy based on executive compensation and find no evidence that the alternative proxy is better than our measure in capturing TMT's true power. Further, we provide evidence that the divergence between our power proxy and the power proxy based on executive compensation reflects non market institutional forces in China and has important implications for corporate outcomes.
引用
收藏
页码:6602 / 6627
页数:27
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