Anti-corruption, safety compliance and coal mine deaths: Evidence from China

被引:20
作者
Xu, Gang [1 ,2 ]
Wang, Xue [3 ,4 ]
Wang, Ruiting [5 ]
Yano, Go [6 ]
Zou, Rong [7 ]
机构
[1] Nankai Univ, Ctr Transnatl Studies, Tianjin, Peoples R China
[2] Nankai Univ, Sch Econ, Tianjin, Peoples R China
[3] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Chinese Financial Studies, Chengdu, Peoples R China
[4] Emory Univ, Dept Econ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
[5] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Finance & Taxat, Chengdu, Peoples R China
[6] Kyoto Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Kyoto 6068501, Japan
[7] Guangdong Univ Finance, Sch Foreign Languages & Cultures, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
关键词
Anti-corruption; Safety compliance; Coal mine deaths; China; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; WATER-POLLUTION; GOVERNMENT; DECENTRALIZATION; INNOVATION; IMPACTS; COSTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2021.05.013
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study evaluates the impact of the anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi since 2013 on coal mine mortality in China. Combining several unique provincial-level datasets on coal mines from 2004 to 2017, we find evidence that provinces with stronger exposure to the anti-corruption campaign have experienced a significantly larger decrease in coalmine death rates. This effect survives a vast array of robustness checks and also displays great heterogeneity. Further evidence suggests the campaign has led to fewer safety violations, more fixed investments and a decrease in profits accompanied by an increase in the costs of principal business in the coal mining industry. The above findings are most consistent with the interpretation that the campaign has made coal mining firms less likely to shirk on safety by curbing collusion between coal mines and local officials. We also rule out other channels such as intensified inspection and the change of employment composition in the industry. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:458 / 488
页数:31
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