Opting for Exit: Informalization, Social Policy Discontent, and Lack of Good Governance

被引:12
作者
Berens, Sarah [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cologne, Cologne Ctr Comparat Polit, Cologne, Germany
关键词
informal sector; institutions; Latin America; the Caribbean; preferences; welfare state; LATIN-AMERICA; TAX MORALE; REDISTRIBUTION; DETERMINANTS; PREFERENCES; PROTECTION; EMPLOYMENT; ECONOMICS; SECTOR; STATES;
D O I
10.1017/lap.2019.58
中图分类号
K9 [地理];
学科分类号
0705 ;
摘要
The informal sector challenges economic growth and hinders the abatement of income disparities in developing countries. This study argues that a weak and poorly governed welfare state can cause the informal sector to increase when individuals use it as an exit option from an unsatisfying welfare system. The article explores how the welfare state's benefit structure and citizens' trust in institutions to deliver public goods affect the likelihood of informality. A logistic hierarchical model, based on cross-sectional survey data from Latin America and the Caribbean and descriptive panel data from Brazil, is used to test the hypothesis. Findings reveal that social policy discontent, low trust, an elitist distribution of welfare benefits, and dysfunctional institutions increase the likelihood of being informally employed. However, workers with greater agency-the better-educated-seem notably less likely to informalize when social policy benefits are targeted toward their own socioeconomic group.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 28
页数:28
相关论文
共 62 条
[11]  
[Anonymous], 2002, TECHNICAL REPORT
[12]  
[Anonymous], MACROECONOMIA DESARR
[13]  
[Anonymous], APPL LINGUISTICS
[14]  
[Anonymous], 2019, MIDDLE E EC SURV MEE
[15]  
[Anonymous], 2009, 4888 WORLD BANK
[16]  
[Anonymous], 2010, 5356 WORLD BANK
[17]  
[Anonymous], 2015, NOVA VETERA
[18]  
[Anonymous], 2018, WDI (World Development Indicators)
[19]  
[Anonymous], 2011, QUALITY GOVT CORRUPT, DOI DOI 10.7208/CHICAGO/9780226729589.001.0001
[20]  
[Anonymous], ILOSTAT KEY IND LAB