Experiments in high-frequency trading: comparing two market institutions

被引:14
作者
Aldrich, Eric M. [1 ]
Lopez Vargas, Kristian [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Cruz, Dept Econ, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA
基金
欧盟地平线“2020”; 欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
Market design; Auctions; High-frequency trading; Continuous double auction; Frequent batch auction; INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY; RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS; FUTURES MARKETS; PRICE FORMATION; BATCH AUCTIONS; ASSET MARKETS; CALL; AGGREGATION; BUBBLES; CRASHES;
D O I
10.1007/s10683-019-09605-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We implement a laboratory financial market where traders can access costly technology that reduces communication latency with a remote exchange. In this environment, we conduct a market design study on high-frequency trading: we contrast the performance of the newly proposed frequent batch auction (FBA) against the continuous double auction (CDA), which organizes trades in most exchanges worldwide. Our evidence suggests that, relative to the CDA, the FBA exhibits (1) less predatory trading behavior, (2) lower investments in low-latency communication technology, (3) lower transaction costs, and (4) lower volatility in market spreads and liquidity. We also find that transitory shocks in the environment have substantially greater impact on market dynamics in the CDA than in the FBA.
引用
收藏
页码:322 / 352
页数:31
相关论文
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