Institutional logics, family firm governance and performance

被引:62
作者
Miller, Danny [1 ,2 ]
Le Breton-Miller, Isabelle [1 ,2 ]
Amore, Mario Daniele [3 ,4 ]
Minichilli, Alessandro [3 ,4 ]
Corbetta, Guido [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] HEC Montreal, 3000 Chemin Cote Ste Catherine, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
[2] Univ Alberta, 3000 Chemin Cote Ste Catherine, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
[3] Bocconi Univ, Dept Management & Technol, Via Roentgen,1, I-20136 Milan, Italy
[4] Bocconi Univ, ICRIOS, Via Roentgen,1, I-20136 Milan, Italy
关键词
Family business; Firm governance; Institutional logics; Financial performance; SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EMERGING MARKETS; STEWARDSHIP; BUSINESS; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; ISOMORPHISM; SUCCESSION; OWNERSHIP; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusvent.2017.08.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Positive and negative views of family firms and their performance abound. Although there have been explanations for this divergence based on conditions of governance and context, the institutional environment has been less thoroughly explored as a source of these differences. We argue that the blend of family and market institutional logics in the regional communities where firms operate can have an important impact on the governance arrangements and financial performance of family firms. Specifically, we find that family-intensive governance is more common where family logic predominates in a region, and does best when this logic remains at modest levels or is countered by market logic. We test and support these notions in a comprehensive sample of private family firms in Italy, an ideal context in which distinct historically-determined logics exists among its 20 regions. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:674 / 693
页数:20
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