The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)

被引：41

作者：

Ma, Debin ^{[1
]}

Rubin, Jared ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] London Sch Econ, London, England

[2] Chapman Univ, Orange, CA 92866 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS | 2019年 / 47卷 / 02期

关键词：

Administrative capacity; Fiscal capacity; State capacity; Principal-agent problem; Monitoring; Credible commitment; Absolutism; Limited government; Taxation; China; Europe; Qing Empire; STATE CAPACITY; OTTOMAN-EMPIRE; SIZE; DIVERGENCE; TAXATION; GOVERNMENT; COMMITMENT; DEMOCRACY; CONFLICT; DECLINE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jce.2019.03.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Tax extraction is often low in absolutist regimes. Why are absolutists unable to convert power into revenue? Supported by evidence from Imperial China, we explain this puzzle with a principal-agent model which reveals that absolutists, unconstrained by rule of law and unable to commit to not predating on their tax-collecting agents (and the masses), may find it optimal to settle for a low wage-low tax equilibrium, while permitting agents to keep extra, unmonitored taxes. Our analysis suggests that low investment in administrative capacity is a conscious choice for an absolutist since it substitutes for credible commitment to refrain from confiscation from its agents.

引用

页码：277 / 294

页数：18

共 90 条

[1] Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective [J].