The influence of interest: Real US interest rates and bilateral investment treaties

被引:12
作者
Betz, Timm [1 ]
Kerner, Andrew [2 ]
机构
[1] Texas A&M Univ, Dept Polit Sci, 2010 Allen Bldg,4348 TAMU, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
[2] Univ Michigan, Dept Polit Sci, 5700 Haven Hall,505 South State St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
Bilateral investment treaties; International capital flows; Foreign direct investment; International institutions; Foreign exchange; Liberalism; Legalization; Delegation; Ratification; IMPORT SURCHARGE; EXTERNAL WEALTH; FOREIGN-ASSETS; BITS; INSTITUTIONS; LIABILITIES; ECONOMIES; DIFFUSION; NATIONS;
D O I
10.1007/s11558-015-9236-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) present developing countries with a trade-off. BITs plausibly increase access to international capital in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), but at the cost of substantially curtailing a government's policy autonomy. Nearly 3000 BITs have been entered into, suggesting that many countries have found this trade-off acceptable. But governments' enthusiasm for signing and ratifying BITs has varied considerably across countries and across time. Why are BITs more popular in some places and times than others? We argue that capital scarcity is an important driver of BIT signings: The trade-off inherent in BITs becomes more attractive to governments as the need to secure access to international capital increases. More specifically, we argue that the coincidence of high US interest rates and net external financial liabilities heightens governments' incentives to secure access to foreign capital, and therefore results in BIT signings. Empirical evidence is consistent with our theory.
引用
收藏
页码:419 / 448
页数:30
相关论文
共 58 条
[1]  
Aizenman J., 1990, 3443 NBER
[2]  
Alesina Alberto, 1993, 4353 NBER
[3]   Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions [J].
Allee, Todd ;
Peinhardt, Clint .
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2010, 54 (01) :1-26
[4]   Fixed-effects negative binomial regression models [J].
Allison, PD ;
Waterman, RP .
SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 2002, VOL 32, 2002, 32 :247-265
[5]  
[Anonymous], 8634 NBER
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2014, World Investment Report
[7]   New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions [J].
Beck, T ;
Clarke, G ;
Groff, A ;
Keefer, P ;
Walsh, P .
WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 15 (01) :165-176
[8]  
Betz T., 2014, POL EC INT ORG C
[9]  
Betz T., 2014, I COMMITMENTS ELECTO
[10]   Sovereign bond ratings and neoliberalism in Latin America [J].
Biglaiser, Glen ;
DeRouen, Karl, Jr. .
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2007, 51 (01) :121-138