Based on Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Construction Safety Supervision

被引：0

作者：

Chen Baochun ^{[1
]}

Chen Jianguo ^{[1
]}

Huang Suping ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Tongji Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Shanghai 200092, Peoples R China

[2] Zhejiang Yiwu Ind & Commercial Coll, Yiwu 322000, Zhejiang, Peoples R China

来源：

Proceedings of 2015 International Symposium - Open Economy & Financial Engineering | 2015年

关键词：

Evolutionary game; Construction safety; Supervision;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

The safety accidents occur frequently has severely restricts the sustainable development of the construction industry. Using evolutionary game theory to build game between the contractor and regulators replicated dynamic equation, get different contractors and regulators game under the situation of evolutionary stable strategy, study conclusion shows that the construction safety supervision stable state with the contractor safety construction needs to increase the investment, regulatory supervision, regulation and related parameters, such as utility costs. Combined with the research building is safe and effective regulation measures are put forward.

引用

页码：72 / 75

页数：4