Taking a chance on KK

被引：52

作者：

Goodman, Jeremy ^{[1
]}

Salow, Bernhard ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] USC Sch Philosophy, MHP,Room 113,3709 Trousdale Pkwy, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA

[2] Trinity Coll Cambridge, Trinity St, Cambridge CB2 1TQ, England

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2018年 / 175卷 / 01期

关键词：

KNOWLEDGE; COULD;

D O I：

10.1007/s11098-017-0861-1

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Dorr et al. (Philos Stud 170:277-287, 2014) present a case that poses a challenge for a number of plausible principles about knowledge and objective chance. Implicit in their discussion is an interesting new argument against KK, the principle that anyone who knows p is in a position to know that they know p. We bring out this argument, and investigate possible responses for defenders of KK, establishing new connections between KK and various knowledge-chance principles.

引用

页码：183 / 196

页数：14

共 11 条

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