From Arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives

被引:8
作者
Schwartz, T [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Polit Sci, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1007/PL00007179
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
From remarkably general assumptions, Arrow's Theorem concludes that a social intransitivity must afflict some profile of transitive individual preferences. It need not be a cycle, but all others have ties. If we add a modest tie-limit, we get a chaotic cycle, one comprising all alternatives, and a tight one to boot: a short path connects any two alternatives. For this we need naught but (Ij linear preference orderings devoid of infinite ascent, (2) profiles that unanimously order a set of all but two alternatives, and with a slightly fortified tie-limit, (3) profiles that deviate ever so little from singlepeakedness. With a weaker tie-limit but not (2) or (3), we still get a chaotic cycle, not necessarily tight. With an even weaker one, we still get a dominant cycle, not necessarily chaotic (every member beats every outside alternative), and with it global instability (every alternative beaten). That tie-limit is necessary for a cycle of any sort, and for global instability too (which does not require a cycle unless alternatives are finite in number). Earlier Arrovian cycle theorems are quite limited by comparison with these.
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页码:1 / 22
页数:22
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