The Curse of Good Intentions: Why Anticorruption Messaging Can Encourage Bribery

被引:24
作者
Cheeseman, Nic [1 ]
Peiffer, Caryn [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Birmingham, Democracy, Int Dev Dept, Birmingham, W Midlands, England
[2] Univ Bristol, Sch Policy Studies, Int Publ Policy & Governance, Bristol, Avon, England
关键词
SOCIAL TRUST; CORRUPTION; INFORMATION; SUPPORT; BEHAVIOR; OPINION; FIGHT;
D O I
10.1017/S0003055421001398
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Awareness-raising messages feature prominently in most anticorruption strategies. Yet, there has been limited systematic research into their efficacy. There is growing concern that anticorruption awareness-raising efforts may be backfiring; instead of encouraging citizens to resist corruption, they may be nudging them to "go with the corrupt grain." This study offers a first test of the effect of anticorruption messaging on ordinary people's behavior. A household-level field experiment, conducted with a representative sample in Lagos, Nigeria, is used to test whether exposure to five different messages about (anti)corruption influence the outcome of a "bribery game." We find that exposure to anticorruption messages largely fails to discourage the decision to bribe, and in some cases it makes individuals more willing to pay a bribe. Importantly, we also find that the effect of anticorruption messaging is conditioned by an individual's preexisting perceptions regarding the prevalence of corruption.
引用
收藏
页码:1081 / 1095
页数:15
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