R&D and CEO departure date: do financial incentives make CEOs more opportunistic?

被引:10
作者
Driver, Ciaran [1 ]
Coelho Guedes, Maria Joao [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ London, Sch Finance & Management, SOAS, London, England
[2] Univ Lisbon, ISEG Sch Econ & Management, Rua Quelhas 6, P-1200781 Lisbon, Portugal
关键词
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; RISK-TAKING; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES; HORIZON PROBLEM; CASH FLOW;
D O I
10.1093/icc/dtx009
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The purpose of this article is to examine whether Research and Development (R&D) expenditure is biased downward because of self-serving behavior of highly incentivized managers. This offers an insight into the general relationship between incentives and opportunism. Using instrumental variables and panel-data methods for a sample of high R&D spenders in the UK, we examine whether R&D is reduced in cases of imminent departure of the CEO. Results show evidence for this but only for the sample above the median in intensity of stock and options in the compensation package. This suggests that opportunism is enhanced by inappropriately strong incentives. The main results are robust to the inclusion of a number of corporate governance variables.
引用
收藏
页码:801 / 820
页数:20
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