Extendability and von Neuman-Morgenstern stability of the core

被引：3

作者：

Jain, Kamal ^{[2
]}

Vohra, Rakesh V. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Managerial Econ & Decis Sci, Kellogg Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[2] Microsoft Res, Redmond, WA 98052 USA

来源：

关键词：

Co-operative games; Core; Stable sets; GAMES;

D O I：

10.1007/s00182-010-0223-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper introduces a strengthening of the notion of a stable core and characterizes it in terms of Kikuta and Shapley's extendability condition.

引用

页码：691 / 697

页数：7

共 12 条

[1] [Anonymous], 1971, Internat. J. Game Theory
[2] [Anonymous], 1986, Unpublished paper
[3] Large cores and exactness
Biswas, AK
Parthasarathy, T
Potters, JAM
Voorneveld, M
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1999, 28 (01) : 1 - 12
[4] Stability and largeness of the core
Biswas, AK
Parthasarathy, T
Ravindran, G
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2001, 34 (02) : 227 - 237
[5] Gillies DB, 1953, THESIS PRINCETON U
[6] Lucas W, 1992, HDB GAME THEORY, P543
[7] A GAME WITH NO SOLUTION
LUCAS, WF
[J]. BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY, 1968, 74 (02) : 237 - &
[8] CORES OF EXACT GAMES .1.
SCHMEIDLER, D
[J]. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS, 1972, 40 (01) : 214 - +
[9] Sharkey W. W., 1982, International Journal of Game Theory, V11, P175, DOI 10.1007/BF01755727
[10] Torrance G W, 1989, Int J Technol Assess Health Care, V5, P559