Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?

被引:107
作者
Ottaviani, M
Sorensen, P
机构
[1] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England
[2] ELSE, London WC1E 6BT, England
[3] Univ Copenhagen, Inst Econ, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark
关键词
committee; reputation; expertise; cheap talk; order;
D O I
10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00119-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Privately informed individuals speak openly in front of other members of a committee about the desirability of a public decision. Each individual wishes to appear well informed. For any given order of speech, committee members may herd by suppressing their true information. With individuals of heterogeneous expertise, optimizing over the order of speech can improve the extraction of information, but not perfectly so. It is not always optimal to use the common anti-seniority rule whereby experts speak in order of increasing expertise. A committee with more able experts may be afflicted by greater herding problems, yielding a worse outcome. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:393 / 421
页数:29
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