Can organizational identification mitigate the CEO horizon problem?

被引：30

作者：

Abernethy, Margaret A. ^{[1
]}

Jiang, Like ^{[1
]}

Kuang, Yu Flora ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Melbourne, Melbourne, Vic, Australia

来源：

ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY | 2019年 / 78卷

关键词：

Organizational identification; Horizon problem; R&D investment; CSR; Management earnings forecasts; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS; IDENTITY; PERFORMANCE; TURNOVER; IRREGULARITIES; INCENTIVES; SUCCESSION; EXECUTIVES; ABILITY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.aos.2019.07.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

CEOs of retirement age are likely to exhibit a "horizon problem," whereby they are reluctant to make decisions that are beneficial to the firm in the long term but potentially costly to the CEOs' personal wealth in the short term. We predict that a CEO with strong organizational identification (Ol) will be less likely to behave opportunistically. Our results are consistent with our expectation when we examine three types of decisions that reflect the CEO horizon problem. Specifically, we find that retiring CEOs with strong Ol are less likely to reduce research and development investments or decrease the firm's commitment to corporate social responsibility. Retiring CEOs with strong Ol also behave less opportunistically when making voluntary disclosures; namely, they issue fewer management earnings forecasts in their last year of employment. Our findings indicate that cultivating a CEO's Ol can be an effective way to mitigate her horizon problem. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：15

共 82 条

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