Abortion and Moral Risk

被引:51
作者
Moller, D. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1017/S0031819111000222
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
It is natural for those with permissive attitudes toward abortion to suppose that, if they have examined all of the arguments they know against abortion and have concluded that they fail, their moral deliberations are at an end. Surprisingly, this is not the case, as I argue. This is because the mere risk that one of those arguments succeeds can generate a moral reason that counts against the act. If this is so, then liberals may be mistaken about the morality of abortion. However, conservatives who claim that considerations of risk rule out abortion in general are mistaken as well. Instead, risk-based considerations generate an important but not necessarily decisive reason to avoid abortion. The more general issue that emerges is how to accommodate fallibilism about practical judgment in our decision-making.
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页码:425 / 443
页数:19
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